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COMMENTS
MANUFACTURING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Parties to civil suits have long recognized that there are procedural
and tactical advantages to litigating in federal court.' Examples of procedural factors deemed advantageous are the broader scope of federal
discovery and the availability of federal interpleader. Tactical advantages,
on the other hand, are less easily distinguished. They seem to stem from
pre-conceptions, biases, and beliefs; examples are the belief that federal
juries render higher verdicts, the greater confidence in the judicial temperment and independence of federal jurists, and the belief that nonresidents
incur local bias in state courts. 2 These differences between the state and
federal forums coupled with the fact that plaintiff's suit may only permit
access to the federal forum on diversity8 have thus caused parties to
undertake the "manufacture" of diversity where it might not have normally existed. 4 The types of devices frequently employed include the
assignment of a claim to an out-of-state resident; the temporary or
permanent change of residence by a party; and the appointment of an
out-of-state representative, such as an executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee, receiver, or representative of a class.5
1. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), held that federal courts must
apply state common law in diversity suits. Since substantive law is no longer a factor
in an attorney's choice of forum, only tactical and procedural advantages remain.
See Summers, Analysis of Factors That Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity
Cases, 47 IOWA L. Rtv. 933 (1962). On the other hand, there are advantages to litigating in the state courts: lower litigation costs; greater familiarity with judges; local
prejudice against the opponent; and the greater participation by judges in trial. See
Comment, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51 VA. L. Rtv. 178 (1965).
A Philadelphia Orphans' Court has made a study of personal injury cases and
concluded that verdicts in the federal courts are generally higher than those rendered
in similar state court cases. As a result this court appointed a nonresident guardian
to create the requisite diversity to sue in federal court. Kaufmann Estate, 87 Pa. D&C
401 (C.P. Phila. Co., 1954).
2. See Summers, note 1 supra•
3. Diversity jurisdiction is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964)
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;
and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof are additional parties.
The corollary
manufacture
destro4. diversity
where toit the
would
normally of
havediversity
existed.is the use of legal device to
. The legal representatives whose citizenship is generally considered controlling
for purposes of diversity are executors or administrators, trustees, receivers, repre-
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Judicial approaches to the problem of manufactured diversity have
not been entirely consistent. The basic problem seems to stem from the
fact that consistency is difficult to achieve when the underlying basis of
a court's decision is policy. The policy involved is, of course, the particular view each federal judge holds on the basic issue of diversity of
citizenship as a jurisdictional base. Those who feel diversity jurisdiction
must be jealously guarded to prevent its abuse and who would therefore
limit its scope or abolish it altogether find support in arguments which
point out that diversity was originally based on speculative fears of
prejudice which are not so apparent today.6 These courts would add
that since the advent of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,7 the adherence to diversity
has reduced federal judges to the position of a "ventriloquist's dummy
to the courts of some particular state."'8 On the other hand, those courts
which argue in support of maintaining diversity jurisdiction and who
would sanction the manufacture of diversity posit that since state and
federal courts would be forced to compete, diversity helps to promote
better administration of justice by producing uniform development of
sentatives of classes, and general guardians. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17. For a comprehensive collection of cases up to 1955 see Cohan & Tate, Manufacturing Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction by the Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality and
Propriety, 1 VILL. L. REv. 201 (1956). See also 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE,
1 17.04, at 115 (2d ed. 1968).
6. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 521 (1928) ; Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REv. 483, 510 (1928) ; Warren, New Light on the History
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 83 (1923).
Several commentators trace the true fear of prejudice against out-of-state
interests to the state legislatures rather than the state courts. See, e.g., Friendly,
supra note 6, at 493-98. Others claim that the absence of controversy over the
adoption of the diversity clause reflected an effort to avoid unnecessary attacks on
the state judges. See Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. Rlv. 869, 875 n.12 (1931). See also Warren, supra note 6, at 83.
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEtM 895 (1953). See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 64 (1963). Mr.
Justice Frankfurther in his concurring opinion in Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co.
v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 56 (1954), stated that the decision in Erie has eliminated the
need for diversity by putting a stop to the freedom of federal courts to fashion rules
of law in defiance of local law.
Others arguing similar positions claim: (1) that since the country is now
economically national, business investments no longer need the diversity "creditor's

court." Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 521-22; (2) congress has recognized that
state courts are capable and on an equal footing with federal courts by raising the
amount in controversy to $10,000 and prohibiting removal of F.E.L.A. and Jones
Act cases. Doub, Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?,
44 A.B.A.J. 243, 245 (1958) ; (3) legitimate state policies are thwarted when citizens
are given the opportunity to escape state courts. Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 525;
(4) the prestige of the federal courts can only be maintained by limiting its jurisdiction. Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 525. See also Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and
the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13

LAW

& CONTEMP.

PROB.

216, 240 (1948);

(5) the federal courts are becoming congested with diversity suits. See ALI,

STUDY

(Part I)
This study of 1,000

OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

170-77 (Official

Draft 1965)

[hereinafter cited ALI STUDY].

cases filed between November 10, 1958 and July 7, 1959 in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania showed that 53% were based on diversity jurisdiction.
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the law.9 However, irrespective of which viewpoint one is disposed to
adopt, it must be admitted that there are certain types of "manufactured"
cases which should not be heard in the federal forum. Those are the
cases in which the creation of diversity of citizenship by assignment or
appointment is almost wholly motivated by the desire to invoke federal
jurisdiction, and also where it is the type of litigation state courts are
equally adept at hearing. The following example describes the type of
"sham" transactions which should not be heard in federal court:
Two Pennsylvania residents are involved in an automobile accident;
plaintiff believes that he can obtain a larger judgment in federal
court rather than in state court, and therefore he executes an assignment of his claim against the defendant for $1.00 consideration
to a New Jersey resident. The "new" party similarly agrees that
upon entry of judgment he will pay plaintiff 95% of the award.
Upon brief analysis it can be seen that parties have joined together to
invoke federal jurisdiction in an ordinary, but nevertheless prevalent,
negligence action. The essential question is whether the federal courts
should allow such actions to be heard at the whim of the plaintiff. On
the other hand, an example of the type of case which might justifiably
be presented in federal court - even where the motive is solely to create
diversity - is a derivative suit brought on behalf of a class of shareholders by a representative. Where stock is publicly held throughout
the United States, it is probable that "true" diversity could never be
present if the representative's citizenship were not controlling. Irrespective of motive, this might be the type of litigation that should only be
brought in federal court because national, even international, interests
might be involved or affected. It is, therefore, mandatory that an adjudication be rendered without a particular state's interest affecting the rights of
the parties. Though this might be considered a "manufactured" case, a
compelling reason can be found for allowing courts to take jurisdiction.
It is the purpose of this Comment to plot the judicial and legislative undertakings which have attempted to achieve a balance between
9. See Moore & Wechstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future,
43 TEXAs L. Rev. 677 (1965); Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73
YALE L.J. 7 (1963).
In further support of maintaining diversity, Yntema & Jaflin, supra note 2,
at 887, list the basic arguments: (1) It helps promote the administration of justice;
(2) It has its basis in the Constitution and is therefore a mandate of the federal
system; See also Phillips & Christenson, The Historical and Legal Background of
the Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J. 959, 964 (1960) ; (3) Diversity has helped to
produce the development of national enterprises and to now restrict that motivating
force would weaken the financial structure of the nation; (4) It mitigates all possible
prejudice to out-of-state litigants. Cf. Comment, The Choice Between State and
Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, note 1 supra. See also Parker, Dual
Sovereignty in the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L. RZv. 407, 409 (1956), where it is
posited that such prejudice denies a nonresident his right to a "fair and impartial
jury ;" (5) Diversity has worked well up to now so why do away with a good thing. See
Frank, supra note 9; Moore & Wechstein, supra note 9; (7) To do away with it
would offend Anglo-Saxon ideas of civil liberty by providing two sets of laws, one
governing the rights of individuals and the other governing the rights of the
government.
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the grant of diversity jurisdiction and protection of the jurisdictional
base of the federal courts. This Comment also explores recent recommendations which propose guidelines to aid the federal courts in determining when a particular matter should be heard in federal court rather
than state court.
II.

HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS ON THE MANUFACTURE OF DIVERSITY

At present, section 1359 of the Judicial Code represents Congress'
attempt to limit the manufacture of diversity. It states:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in
which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly
or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such
court. 10
Prior to the enactment of section 1359, there were two separate statutes
aimed at restricting the ability of parties to create diversity. In order
to prevent litigants from invoking federal jurisdiction by speciously assigning claims to citizens of other states, Congress first enacted section
11 of the Judicial Code of 1789.11 This section, popularly known as
the anti-assignment clause, required that both the original assignor and
13
the assignee bringing suit 1 2 possess the requisite diversity of citizenship
except in those cases where foreign bills of exchange and corporate
bearer notes 14 were assigned. The anti-assignment clause fell short of
its intended purpose, however, for two reasons: firstly, its all-encompassing language prevented bona fide assignments 15 and, secondly, the courts
excluded from its scope the transfer of property interests,' 6 promises
and duties implied in law, 17 and assignments by operation of law.'"
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).

11. Nor shall any circuit or district court have cognizance of any suits to recover
the contents of any promissory note, or other chose in action, in favor of an
assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court if no assignment
had been made. Except in cases of foreign bills of exchange.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
12. Mesne conveyances were disregarded. See Emshiemer v. New Orleans, 186
U.S. 33 (1902).
13. The section was constitutionally challenged as a limitation on diversity jurisdiction but was upheld. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) ; Turner v.
The President, Directors, and Co. of the Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)
8 (1799).
14. Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 499 (1925).
15. Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U.S. 209 (1881) ; Consolidated Rubber Tire Co.
v. Ferguson, 183 F. 756 (2d Cir. 1910); Cf. Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179
(1933). It thus operated as an inflexible "wooden rule." Cohan & Tate, supra note 5,
at 208.
16. Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U.S. 589 (1915); Peterson v. Sucro, 93 F.2d 878
(4th Cir. 1938).
17. Ambler v. Eppinger, 137 U.S. 480 (1890); Menasha Wooden Ware Co. v.
Southern Ore Co., 244 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1917).
18. The appointment of executors, administrators, trustees, receivers, and guardians were therefore not within the purview of the anti-assignment clause. See, e.g.,
New Orleans v. Game's Adm'r, 138 U.S. 595 (1891). See generally Reviser's Note
to 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964) ; Dobie, Jurisdiction of the United States District Court
as Affected by Assignment, 6 VA. L. Rv. 533 (1920). See also Comment, Chaos of
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Subsequently, in an effort to prevent litigants from misusing the
jurisdictional base of the federal courts,' 9 Congress enacted section 37
of the Judicial Code in 1875.20 This statute supplemented the antiassignment clause with language prohibiting "improper and collusive"
transfers to create a case cognizable in federal court. The first case to
interpret the statute's broad prohibition was Williams v. Nottawa,21 where
the plaintiff assignee attempted to bring suit as owner of three bearer
bonds and as a collection agent for citizens of Michigan who owned the
remaining bonds. Since the obligor was a township located in Michigan,
the assignors themselves could not satisfy the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that since the transfers to the
collection agent were never intended to change ownership, they were
colorable assignments and must therefore have been undertaken for the
purpose of creating federal jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the
plaintiffs were collusively joined, and that under section 37, the circuit
court should have dismissed the case on its own motion. In announcing
that the test under section 37 would be one of colorability, the Court
relied upon earlier assignment cases which were previously considered
outside the scope of the anti-assignment clause. 22 Thus the new section
was to be based on standards previously announced in the area of assignments, but was not to be limited in application solely to transfers by
assignment. 28 The factors to be weighed by courts in deciding whether
a particular transfer was bona fide or colorable were: (1) the amount
Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts, 35 ILL. L. Riv. 566, 569 (1941), which
states that the exclusions recognized and the confusing amendments enacted made the

anti-assignment clause "a jumble of legislative jargon."
19. The primary purpose of section 37 was to deal with cases of defective jurisdiction which were not apparent from the pleadings. At common law, a party seeking
to challenge jurisdiction could only do so by presenting a plea in abatement prior to
pleading the merits or else the challenge was waived. If so waived, the fact that the
court was truly without jurisdiction would then incidentally appear during trial.
Since the courts felt powerless to afford a remedy because the merits were already
being litigated, they were constrained to proceed. See, e.g., Farmington v. Pillsbury,
114 U.S. 138 (1885) ; De Sobry v. Nicholson, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 420 (1865). In order
to remedy the situation, the statute empowered the federal courts to consider the
question of jurisdiction at any time and on the courts' own motion. See Hill v.
Walker, 167 F. 241 (8th Cir. 1909) ; 2A J. Moo" , supra note 5, f"8.23, at 1825-27 n.l.
20. That if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court or removed from a State
court to a circuit court of the United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of
said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto,
that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy
properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said
suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this
act, the said circuit court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the
suit or remand it to the court from which it was removed as justice may require,
and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just. ...
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 472 (emphasis added).
With minor changes, not here material, the provision appeared as Section 37
of the Judicial Code of 1911 and as Section 80 of the original Title 28 of the United
States Code.
21. 104 U.S. 209 (1881).
22. See, e.g., Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280 (1867); Smith v.
Kernochen, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 198 (1849). See p. 730 & note 14 supra.
23. See, e.g., Marine River Phosphate Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 105 U.S.
175 (1882).
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of consideration paid, (2) the completeness of the interest transferred,
and (3) the possibility that the proceeds derived from suit would be reconveyed.24 If the transfer was bona fide, the motive behind it was irrelevant and could not render the transfer "improper and collusive. '25
As noted previously, assignment by operation of law - the appointment of an executor, administrator, trustee, receiver, and guardian was excluded from the scope of the anti-assignment clause. 26 Therefore, contemporary courts, having the benefit of a strictly worded section 37, did not contemplate a prohibition against the appointment of
those representatives.2 7 One case, Cerri v. Akron-People's Telephone
28
Co.,

did, however, find the appointment of such a representative "im-

proper" or "collusive" under section 37. In Cerri, the plaintiffs secured
the appointment of a nonresident administrator whose sole function was
to institute a wrongful death action in federal court. There were no
other assets in the estate except the cause of action, and the proceeds
derived from suit would have gone directly to the beneficiaries and
not come under the administrator's supervision. Under these facts the
court was able to analogize to the formation of a "naked trust," 29 and
therefore conclude that no real and substantial controversy existed between the administrator and the defendants.30 The view expressed in
Cerri was that the test of collusiveness was aimed at the substance of
the transaction and therefore the legal form could be disregarded. Though
Cerri was never expressly overruled, 31 its holding was narrowly read
2
into extinction by subsequent cases .
The case with which diversity could be treated under these old
statutes is exemplified by the case of Black & While Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co. 3 3 In that case,
a Kentucky corporation sought to take advantage of federal common
24. In most cases these factors were not separately distinguished. See Southern
Realty Investment Co. v. Walker, 211 U.S. 603 (1909) ; Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East
Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293 (1908) ; Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895) ; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315 (1889) ; Central Paper
Co. v. Southwick, 56 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1932).
25. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931). Mecom was
concerned, however, with the ability of a party to destroy rather than create diversity.
There is no legislative policy against the avoidance of diversity but since there is
such a policy against its creation the considerations would seem to be different. See
3A J. MOORS, supra note 5,
17.05, at 152. See also Note, 96 U. PA. L. Rrv. 897
(1948). See note 81 infra.
26. See p. 730 & note 18 supra.
27. See, e.g., Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U.S. 121 (1883) ; Goff's
Adm'r v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 36 F. 299 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1888).
28. 219 F. 285 (N.D. Ohio 1914).
29. Id. at 292.
30. Id.
31. It may, however, be suggested that it was effectively overruled sub silentio
by Harrison v. Love, 81 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1936). See County of Todd v. Loegering,
297 F.2d 470, 474 (8th Cir. 1961); Jaffe v. Philadelphia & Western R.R. Co., 180
F.2d 1010, 1013 (3d Cir. 1950).
32. See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 47 F.2d 28, 30, 32 (10th Cir.),
rev'd, 284 U.S. 183 (1931) ; Carter v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 29 F.2d 628,
629 (N.D. Okla. 1928).
33. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
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law3 4 by conveying all its property to a newly created Tennessee corporation. After the conveyance was complete the Kentucky corporation
was dissolved. Two months later its progeny instituted suit in federal
court against a Kentucky defendant. In holding the transfer sufficient
to create diversity the Supreme Court reasoned that since the transfer
was complete, the motive behind it, even if solely to create diversity,
was irrelevant and not fatal.3 5
Though other corporations had attempted to create diversity through
37
the Court found
the use of such "interstate ballets" 36 and had failed
Black & White clearly distinguishable. The Court reasoned that cases
where section 37 prevented jurisdiction from attaching, the corporations
involved had continued to transact business while transferring only the
property involved in the suits to their subsidiaries. In Black &' White,
on the other hand, the Tennessee corporation dissolved after conveyance
of all its assets. It was this dissolution that made the transfer "complete" because the parent corporation, by its mere non-existence, no
longer had the ability to force a reconveyance of the proceeds realized
38

from suit.

III.

THE 1948 REvISION

Discontent with the operation of the anti-assignment section as an
effective limitation on the manufacture of diversity39 ultimately led to
the Congressional revision in 1948 in which both section 11 and section
37 were combined to form section 1359. The statute has not undergone
further change and presently reads:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in
which any party by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such
or collusively
40
court.

34. Prior to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), permitted forum shopping since federal courts were not

bound to administer state substantive law. Therefore, a case similar to Black & White
could not arise today. See Comment, 73 YAL4 L.J. 873, 883 (1964).
35. 276 U.S. 524-25 (1928).
36. Comment, 73 YALt L.J. 873, 883 (1964).
37. Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293 (1908);
Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895).
38. See Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293,
300-04 (1908).
Black & White may also be distinguished on the ground that the corporation
was making an effective change of domicile by moving to the new state. It is settled
law that the establishment of a new domicile, to the present exclusion of any other
place, will also change a party's citizenship for purpose of diversity. Gilbert v. David,
235 U.S. 561 (1915); Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Ohle, 117 U.S. 123 (1886). See Note,
Manufactured Federal Diversity Jurisdiction and Section 1359, 69 COLUM. L. Rgv.
706 (1969). The motive for the change is immaterial as long as there exists a present
intention to remain permanently. Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315 (1889).
39. See p. 732 supra.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 10
VILLANOVA

A.

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

Effect on the Manufacture of Diversity by Appointment

The reviser's notes indicate that no change in the prior law of section 37 - the section that prohibited "improper or collusive" joinder
was intended by the 1948 enactment. 41 However, the revision did
eliminate the words which granted the district court the power to dismiss a collusive case on its own motion. It was felt that this principle
need not be stated within the newly revised statute since modern courts
realized that they possessed the power to dismiss on their own motion. 42
The first court to interpret section 1359, Jaffe v. Philadelphia &
Western R.R. Co., 43 agreed with the reviser's position that there was
no substantial difference between the old and new statutes. The court
held that if the appointed representative is the "real party in interest"
under state law, his citizenship controls for purposes of diversity. The
fact that the representative was appointed solely to create diversity was
44
immaterial.
Shortly thereafter, the Third Circuit handed down Corabi v. Auto
Racing Inc., 45 a case frequently cited for its well reasoned opinion.46
In Corabi, the original administratrix resigned so that a nonresident administrator could be appointed to institute a wrongful death action in
federal court. Though the appointment was sought solely for the purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction, the court held that the appointment was not "improper" or "collusive" within the meaning of section
1359. In so holding, the court found Corabi to be factually indistinguishable from Black & White.47 There existed a "real and substantial controversy"; the transfer and succession of interests was actual, not feigned
or colorable since the administratrix was discharged and the administrator
was appointed prior to the inception of the suit. Moreover, the real
party in interest, the administrator, possessed the cause of action and
was therefore entitled to prosecute. 48 It is evident from the court's reliance on Black & White that Corabi demanded a transfer of interest
amounting to a formal severance of all ties. 49 Black & White found
41. See Reviser's notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
42. Id. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (3), wherein the power of a court to
dismiss on its own motion for lack of jurisdiction is expressly stated.
43. 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
44. The decision may be criticized for its stand on "motive" because it relies on
Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931), for that proposition.
Mecom only addressed itself to the destruction, not the creation of diversity. See
note 23 supra.
45. 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959).
46. See, e.g., Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn.), aff'd
Per curiam, 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963).
47. 276 U.S. 518 (1928). See p. 733 supra.
48. Compare Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 525 (1928), with Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264
F.2d 784, 787 (3d Cir. 1959).
49. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smalley, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 620 (1828). Corabi has
been criticized as reading Black & White too closely and therefore requiring only a
severance of formal connections between transferor and transferee. See Note, 73 YALE

L.J. 873 (1963).
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the severance extant in the fact that the original corporation dissolved
subsequent to the transfer of assets while Corabi found the severance
complete by emphasizing that the administratrix resigned prior to the
inception of suit.
If Corabi is to be criticized, it is most easily attacked on its dictionary definition of "improper and collusive." With aid from Webster's
New International Dictionary5 ° the court concluded that "improper"
clearly connoted "impropriety." The court reasoned that creation of
diversity through the means used in the Corabi case was not improper
as defined by Webster and, further, that Congress could have prohibited
such a situation by more direct means than use of the words "improperly
or collusively." 5' 1 In interpreting "collusively", the court, quoting Webster,
required "[a]n agreement between two or more persons to defraud a
person of his rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden
by law."'52 The use of state law to create diversity, with the object of
securing a high verdict was not, in the court's opinion, within the meaning of collusive as so defined.
The court's attempt to define exactly what Congress envisioned as
an abuse of diversity jurisdiction was in itself laudable, however, in basing the decision on dictionary definitions rather than on legislative history, the court seems to have offended the broadest mandates of statutory
construction. Additional criticism may be directed at the Corabi court's
finding that parties could only have been collusively joined to invoke
diversity when there had been "an illegal agreement or understanding
between opposing sides of a litigation rather than . . . an arrangement

effected by one side of the sort at bar. 51 3 This conclusion was clearly
at odds with the purpose of the first congressional limitation on diversity
jurisdiction - the anti-assignment clause - which restricted the possibility of collusion among plaintiffs by requiring both the assignor and
54
assignee to be of diverse citizenship to the opposing party.
Although this dictionary interpretation of section 1359 was dicta,
Corabi became well accepted authority for the proposition that the appointment of a representative, if considered the real party in interest
under state law, was not improper or collusive within the meaning of
section 1359 and was therefore a valid means of manufacturing diversity
jurisdiction. 55
50. WXBSThR'S Ntw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1959).
51. 264 F.2d at 788.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See p. 730 & note 12 supra.
55. For administrators see Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir.
1964), followed in Curnow v. West View Park Co., 337 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1964);
Jamison v. Kammerer, 264 F.2d 789 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959) (the
abuse of manufactured diversity was especially apparent in Jamison since the same
administrator was appointed in 33 other cases) ; McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th
Cir. 1954) ; Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 217 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn.), aff'd per
curiam, 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1963); Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). For representatives under wrongful death statutes see janzen v.
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Effect on the Manufacture of Diversity by Assignment

The effect of the revision on section 11 - the anti-assignment
clause - was more far-reaching. The reviser's notes indicate that the
combination of the two old sections envisioned a product encompassing
"the best of both worlds." 56 The restrictions upon bona fide assignments and the exceptions built into section 11 had permitted only partial
fullfillment of its purpose57 - to prevent the manufacture of jurisdiction by assignment. The limitations were therefore dropped in favor of
the more direct approach taken by section 37.58 Where the anti-assignment
section did fulfill its purpose, the reviser did not seem to contemplate
a change from standards applied in the earlier cases. If the assignment
was merely a sham or colorable, it could not be used to create diversity. 59
After the 1948 revision, assignment cases interpreting section 1359
took two basic approaches in determining whether the assignment was
sufficient to create diversity. Some courts seem to have interpreted the
revision as a rejection of the standards developed under the old antiassignment section, and have adopted tests developed under the appointment cases - Black & White6 ° and Corabi.61 Courts adhering to
this view held that if the assignment was lawful under state contract
or statutory law, it was not prohibited by section 1359 as a means of
creating diversity. 62 The mere assignment of a claim for $1.00, without
more, was sufficient to confer citizenship, for diversity purposes, on the
assignee. 63 The burden of proof was on the defendant to show collusion
via a secret arrangement or fraud on the court. Only then would section 1359 have any effect. 64 Although this approach succeeded in pre-

senting uniform standards for both assignments and appointments under
Goos, 302 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1962); County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470
(8th Cir. 1961). Cf. Grady v. Irvine, 254 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Rodriquez v.
Wheeler, 16 F.R.D. 103 (S.D. Tex. 1954). But see Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp.
810 (D. Minn. 1968). The court found the reasoning of McSparran v. Weist, 402
F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969), to be very cogent, but
was unable to follow it since it was bound by previous Eighth Circuit decisions.
For general guardians see Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 217 F. Supp. 880 (D.
Conn.), aff'd per curiam, 325 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1963). But cf. Brough v. Strathmann
Supply Co., 358 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1966). Prior to McSparran only three cases
purported to question the authority of Corabi: Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172
F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949), was decided on the real party in interest question rather
than section 37; Campbell v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 148 F. Supp. 209 (D. Idaho
1957), was decided upon an heir being found to be an indispensable party to the suit
under a wrongful death statute and therefore section 1359 was not raised; and Cerri
v. Arkon-People's Telephone Co., 219 F. 285 (N.D. Ohio 1914). See p. 734 &
note 30 supra.
56. See Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
57. See p. 730 supra.
58. Cf. Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179 (1933).
59. See Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U.S. 209 (1881).
60. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
61. 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959).
62. See City of Eufaula v.Pappas, 213 F. Supp. 749 (M.D.Ala. 1963). Cf.
Archie v.Shell Oil Co., 110 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1953), aff'd 210 F.2d 653 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 843 (1954).
63. City of Eufaula v. Pappas, 213 F. Supp. 749 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
64. Id.
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section 1359, its effect was to encourage the use of sham devices to create
diversity rather than to restrict the creation of diversity by device.
The second approach adopted by courts after the 1948 revision
was merely an affirmation of the test utilized by pre-revision courts.
Rather than looking at the terms of the assignment to see whether it
was a valid transfer under state law, the courts looked to the nature
of the interest or claim conveyed. The minimum interest required was
an independent interest - something other than the assignment itself in the claim that predated the assignment. 5 Other courts utilizing this
same approach were more demanding in that they required not only
a complete transfer of all interests in the dispute or claim but also a
showing that sufficient consideration was given to insure that the assignee
was not a mere collection agent.0, Thus in Ferrara v. Philadelphia
Laboratories, Inc.,

7

the court held that the lawful assignment of a

cause of action to a trustee had been "improper" or "collusive" within
the meaning of section 1359 since the interest acquired under the revocable
trust agreement merely directed the trustee to bring suit in federal court.
The absence of payment for the management of the trust property together with an agreement to reimburse expenses was, in the court's
opinion, only further evidence of the trustee's lack of interest in the res.
The approach adopted by the Ferraracourt is clearly the most flexible, and, as such, better designed to handle the intricate fact situations
which sometimes pervade the area. The Ferraracourt was able to weigh
"all the circumstances attending the transfer";0s the nature of the interest retained by the transferor; the transferor's ability to force a reconveyance without valuable consideration; the motive or purpose behind
the transfer; the solicitation of the plaintiff to bring suit coupled with a
reimbursement arrangement for costs and expenses; and an examination
of who actually controlled the litigation.
If the first approach to assignment transfers - validity of the
assignment under contract law - was discounted as contrary in effect
to the policy of restricting manufactured cases, then two other distinct
tests appeared in determining whether there had been an "improper"
65. Dunham v. Robertson, 198 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1952); Rosenberg v. Platt,
229 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Wis. 1964) ; Paper Makers Importing Co. v. City of Milwaukee,
165 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Wis. 1958). Cf. Commerce Mfg. Co. v. Blue Jeans Corp.,
146 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.C. 1956). See also Bradbury v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73, 76 (10th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963), which Professor Moore refers to as
utilizing the "common sense approach" since the court neither depended on the validity
of the transfer under state law nor the completeness of the transfer but chose to look
at the historical purpose of the section's "denial of diversity jurisdiction when it would
operate to serve a purpose which is unsuited to the good order of federal court
administration." See 3A J. MooRn, supra note 5, 17.05, at 159.
66. National Surety Corp. v. Inland Properties, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Ark.
1968) ; Ferrara v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967) ;
Amar v. Gamier Enterprises, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 211 (C.D. Cal. 1966) ; Hartmann Coal
Mining Co. v. Hoke, 157 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ; Steinberg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp.
791 (D.P.R. 1951). Cf. Birkins v. Seaboard Serv., 96 F. Supp. 245 (D.N.J. 1950).
67. 272 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Vt. 1967).
68. Id. at 1007.
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or "collusive" joinder under section 1359. In cases involving the appointment of a legal representative, the question was whether the appointee was the real party in interest under state law. If, however, the
case involved the assignment of a claim or interest, then it was a question of whether the assignment was "real" or "colorable." If the tests
for determining the validity of an appointment and an assignment were completely different and there was no common ground, then one wondered
whether the revision and combination of the two old statutes into section
1359 was not a useless and confusing act by Congress. However, this
was the state of the law until recently.
IV.
A.

RECENT COURT DECISIONS

McSparran'sEffect on the Appointment Test

Amidst the clamor for federal diversity reform, 69 two courts refused to wait for legislative action7 ° and attempted to reinterpret section
1359 so as to give it "meaning."
The most notable action was taken by the Third Circuit in McSparran
v. Weist.71 There, the plaintiff, an out-of-state resident, was appointed
as an injured minor's guardian for the sole purpose of creating diversity
of citizenship with the defendant, a Pennsylvania resident. The court,
in applying a novel mode of construction to section 1359, expressly overruled Corabi72 and Jaffe 78 holding that "a nominal party designated
simply for the purpose of creating diversity of citizenship, who has no
real or substantial interest in the dispute or controversy, is improperly
or collusively named."'74 In thus construing section 1359, the court
75
relied on language no longer present in the statute. The "unnecessary"
language omitted by the reviser in 194870 - that portion of section 37
which empowered the court to dismiss on its own motion - was now7
held to give "content" to the otherwise ambiguous wording of the statute.1
The full scope of McSparran, is not, however, entirely clear. In the
first instance, though the case itself involved the appointment of a
general guardian, the holding is not merely limited to this one type of
69. See ALI STUDY supra note 8, at 170-77. The ALI proposes a change in the
statutory language. See pp. 743-44 infra.
70. Professor Moore states that legislative reform is not needed, but the burden
is on the courts to make section 1359 effective as a restriction on diversity manufacture. See 3A J.MOORP, supra note 5, 1 17.05, at 166.
71. 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
72. 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959).
73. 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950). The McSparran court also disapproved Fallat
v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955), since Fallat implied approval of "manufactured" diversity.
74. 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
75. See Reviser's justifications for omitting the relevant language at p. 734 supra.
76. That portion of section 37 upon which the court relied was the district court's
ability to dismiss a suit "at any time

.

.

.

[when]

such suit does not really and

substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said
court..." Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472 (emphasis added).
77. 402 F.2d 867, 873 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
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appointment, but rather, purports to apply to the appointment of administrators and executors as well. 78

Moreover, the court's interpretation

of what is "collusive" joinder is subject to a number of interpretations.
The court states that parties 79 will henceforth be considered "collusively
joined" when a representative is appointed who would not otherwise
have been named but for the purpose of creating diversity.80 This
broad language leaves many questions unanswered; for example, what
factors are to be considered in determining the "purpose" of a given
transfer, and how extensive an analysis will be required of district courts
in making that determination. Clearly, the test proposed is a motive
test. This is made evident by the fact that the court goes to great
lengths to distinguish those cases which had taken the position that an
exploration of motive was either unnecessary or irrelevant. Initially,
the McSparran court challenged Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.,81
a case which stood for the proposition that a court on review could
not inquire into the motives of the parties in securing the appointment
since to do so would be an admission that the parties had successfully
perpetrated a fraud.8 2 In commenting on Mecom, the McSparran Court
stated :
We do not impugn this decree collaterally by refusing to recognize
the citizenship of a straw guardian. Guardian he remains, but since
he is acting in the capacity of a straw party we refuse to recognize
83
his citizenship for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction.
Additionally, the Third Circuit easily distinguished Mecom since
4
that case involved the destruction rather than the creation of diversity.
Similarly, the McSparran court distinguished Black & White on the
ground that when the Supreme Court concluded that an examination
78. While in the course of distinguishing Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.,
284 U.S. 183 (1931), the court noted that the case at bar was "immediately distinguishable" since Mecom involved an administrator while McSparran involved a
guardian who did not have title to the ward's right of action. The court chose to
ignore this distinction, however, stating: "[W]e believe § 1359 reaches executors
and administrators as well as guardians and therefore put this difference aside." 402
F.2d 867, 875 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
Other courts could easily distinguish McSparran by pointing out that the
holding must be limited to guardians. Support for this position is found in the fact
that a guardian "does not have title to the ward's right of action" while other
appointed representatives do possess title. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
recognize the distinction. Compare FD. R. Civ. P. 17(a) with FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
Chief Judge Biggs interprets the court's holding as also applying to trustees.
See Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1968) (dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
79. The McSparran court is careful to state that the collusion exists between the
representative and the party seeking his appointment - not between the plaintiff and
defendant as indicated by Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir.
1959). See p. 735 supra.
80. 402 F.2d 867, 873 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
81. 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
82. Id. at 189.
83. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 874 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 903 (1969).
84. See note 25 supra.
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of motive was irrelevant, "it did so in the context of a real transaction
85
which had significance beyond establishment of diversity jurisdiction.
Courts which follow McSparran may select various approaches in

applying the motive test. They may examine such factors as the ability and
experience of the representative to manage the property. 6 The relationship of the representative to the beneficiary87 will not only be relevant
but also may be controlling. The sufficiency of the evidence required
to find an "improper and collusive" joinder will thus be subject to various
interpretations. In classifying a transaction as "improper" or "collusive"
courts may require a showing that only one among several valid motives
for the appointment of the nonresident be the creation of diversity, or
they may require it to be the primary motive. Finally, courts may undertake to expose all the possible factors involved in the appointment, balance them, and find that when compared to the unexpressed 88 desire
to create diversity, the latter outweighs the former. The two elements
that will most influence a court's choice are its view of diversity jurisdiction and the nature of the litigation itself. As noted earlier, a particular court's view on jurisdiction itself must influence its view on the
propriety of a "manufactured" case. Irrespective of the approach adopted,
a judicial conclusion that there has been an "improper" or "collusive"
joinder, will result in the representative being treated as a straw party
to the action.8 9 Even though the appointee is empowered to bring suit
as the real party in interest under state law, his citizenship will not
be determinative for purposes of diversity. 90 He would, however, remain
on the record as the party responsible for costs.
The application of the test adopted by the McSparran court will
not be free from difficulty. The test itself marks an abandonment of
objective facts in favor of subjective criteria. This change may cause
some to object that the new test will open the door to perjurious testimony and all but destroy predictability of result.91 The representative
will no longer be able to obtain mere formal appointment and then
use that appointment to invoke diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts.
He must carry the burden of proving that there has not been an "improper and collusive" joinder of parties before jurisdiction will attach. 92
85. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 875 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 903 (1969).
86. Id. at 873.
87. Cf. Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).
88. Parties would no longer be as free to openly admit that the appointment was
undertaken solely to create diversity.

89. "As a straw party he does not stand in the position of a true fiduciary whose

involvement in litigation is incidental to his general duty to protect the interests of
those for whom he is responsible." McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 873 (3d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969) (emphasis added).
90. See 3A J. MOOR4, supra note 5, 1 17.04, at 115; C. WRairHT, FEDERAL COURTS
81 (1963).
91. See Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1968) (Judge Biggs
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
92. The party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts has the
burden of proving all the facts necessary to its sustenance. See, e.gq., McNutt v.
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In practice the plaintiff need only allege that diversity exists between
the parties. On motion by the defendant to dismiss due to "improper"
or "collusive" joinder, the plaintiff would probably incur the burden
of moving forward with evidence to prove that the court has jurisdiction. It is not inconceivable that lengthy trials on the jurisdictional
issue alone will develop, especially where the defendant is able to rebut
the plaintiff's evidence by showing that the plaintiff had one or more
equally well-qualified resident representatives from which to choose, but
nevertheless selected a nonresident. The courts' examination of motive
together with the plaintiffs' burden of proof on the issue of jurisdiction
will then make section 1359 a most effective limitation on diversity suits.
B.

Caribbean Mills' Effect on the Assignment Test

Although not quite as notable as the McSparran decision, the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Caribbean Mills, Inc. v. Kramer,9 3 is nevertheless
important in that it helps to clearly establish a unified view on the
creation of diversity jurisdiction by assignment. In Caribbean Mills the
plaintiff, for $1.00 consideration, was assigned a claim for breach of
contract. On the same day, he reassigned to the assignors 95% of
any proceeds that he might receive. 94 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff
brought suit against the defendant asserting jurisdiction based on diversity
of citizenship. 5 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held the assignment to be
colorable since it did not divest the assignors of their interest in the
lawsuit. The court determined that the assignee was obviously a collection agent chosen solely for the purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction. In view of this determination the court suggested that a review
of the "relevant" authority demonstrated that the parties had been
"improperly" or "collusively" joined under section 1359.96 Although the
holding is not startling, of great import is the fact that during the course
of its analysis the court admitted that it was unable to distinguish
97
City of Eufaula v. Pappas,
a case standing for the general proposition
that an assignment, if valid under state contract or statutory law, is
not prohibited by section 1359. The Caribbean Mills court found no
material distinction between the two cases; both assignments were exeGeneral Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936). There is, at the outset, a
presumption that the federal court lacks jurisdiction, unless the contrary is apparent
from the record. See Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211
U.S. 293, 302 (1908), quoting Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327,
336-37 (1895). See also City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63,
76-77 (1941).
93. 392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1968).
94. The second agreement permitted Kramer to pay his attorney up to 33/2t%
of any recovery. Kramer was then to receive 5% of the remainder and to pay the
other 95% as a "bonus" to the assignor. 392 F.2d at 388 n.1.
95. The plaintiff was a citizen of Texas and the defendant was duly incorporated
in Haiti. Diversity was therefore claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2) (1964).
96. The court relied on Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U.S. 209 (1881), and cases
cited in note 21 supra.
97. 213 F. Supp. 749 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
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cuted for $1.00, both were valid under state contract law, and the
assignee in each case had agreed to divide the proceeds derived from
suit with the assignorsY5 Even so, the court refused to follow City
of Eufala - a rejection of great significance since that case was decided in a district court within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit. 99
On appeal Caribbean Mills was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
In speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Harlan made it very
clear that the legality of the assignment under state law was a question separate and distinct from any determination of federal jurisdiction:
[Petitioner] suggests that the undisputed legality of the assignment
under Texas law necessarily rendered it valid for purposes of federal jurisdiction. We cannot accept this contention. The existcnce
of federal jurisdiction is a matter of federal, not state, law ...
[T]his Court several times [has] held that an assignment could
be "improperly or collusively made" even though binding under
state law. . . [T]o accept [Petitioner's] argument would render
§ 1359 largely incapable of accomplishing its purpose .... 00
The Supreme Court's position on the collateral issue of motive in
assignment cases such as Caribbean Mills is equally clear - the motive
behind the assignment is not a consideration carrying weight in such
cases. Having found a "total lack of previous connection with the
matter . .. [the Court decided there was] little doubt that the assignment was for purposes of collection." 10
'
Hence, the Court was able to
distinguish those cases which hold that where the transfer of a claim
is absolute, i.e., where the transferor retains no interest in the subject
matter, then the transfer is not "improperly or collusively made," regardless of the transferor's motive. 10 2 In further justifying its position
on motive the Court also distinguished earlier appointment cases where
motive to create diversity jurisdiction was held to render an appointment of an out-of-state representative "improper" or "collusive."
Cases involving representatives vary in several respects from those
in which jurisdiction is based on assignments: (1) in the former
situation, some representative must be appointed before suit can be
brought, while in the latter the assignor normally is himself capable of suing in state court; (2) under state law, different kinds
98. In City of Eufaula a formal agreement of reassignment between the assignee
and assignors was never executed but the parties did have an understanding to that
effect. Caribbean Mills found that the lack of a formal agreement to reconvey was
inconsequential where the facts indicate that the assignment was not "real" and the
assignee was a collection agent. See Caribbean Mills, Inc. v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387,
394 n.6 (5th Cir. 1968).
99. The appellee, Kramer, noted that the decision in City of Eufaula was written
by Judge Johnson who now sits with the circuit court. See Brief for Appellee at 27,
Caribbean Mills, Inc. v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1968).
100. Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 829 (1969) (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 827.
102. Id. at 828 n.9; citing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) ; Williamson v. Osenton, 232
U.S. 619 (1914); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904); Cross v.
Allen, 141 U.S. 528 (1891).
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of guardians and administrators may possess discrete sorts of powers;
and (3) all such representatives owe their appointment to the decree
of a state court, rather than solely to an action of the parties. It
is not necessary to decide whether these distinctions amount to a
difference for purposes of § 1359.103
In rejecting the proposition that an assignment, if valid under state
law, is also sufficient to create diversity, the Supreme Court has eliminated
the confusion emanating from the type of reasoning which originated
with Carabi. The question of whether the transfer was "real" or "colorable" is now controlling. 10 4 However, even after the McSparran and
Caribbean Mills decisions two separate tests remain under section 1359 one governing appointments and another governing assignments.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Among the commentators advocating change in diversity jurisdiction is the American Law Institute. 10 The ALI has recommended two
legislative proposals which affect "manufactured cases." The proposal
which has provoked the most controversy is section 1301 (b) (4). It
provides:
An executor, or an administrator, or any person representing
the estate of a decedent or appointed pursuant to statute with authority to bring an action because of the death of a decedent shall
be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent;
and a guardian, committee, or other like representative of an infant
or incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same
State as the person represented. 10
Thus, the ALI recommends that the representative be deemed to be a
citizen of the represented's state when placed in certain fiduciary positions. The section is clearly "designed to prevent either the creation
or the defeat of diversity jurisdiction by the appointment of a representative having a different citizenship from the infant, incompetent,
or decedent he is appointed to represent.' 10 7 It is based upon the assumption that these particular suits are essentially local contests between
co-citizens and therefore do not properly belong in the federal courts.' 0 8
What is actually reflected, however, is the basic substance of the suit at
103. 394 U.S. 823, 828 n.9 (1969).
Though it may be viewed as dicta, the Court mentions that it need not consider as relevant appointment cases where a motive to create diversity is present. The
words are thus couched in terms of a or any (singular) motive. It might be surmised
that the Supreme Court thus views the holding in McSparran as requiring a showing
of this one factor - all other factors being ignored. Compare page 740 and notes
86-88 supra.

104. There is some variation within "colorability" on the type of interest the assignee need have for the assignment to be "real." See pp. 736-37 and notes 64-65 supra.
105. ALI STUDY, note 8 supra.

106. ALI STUDY, note 8 supra, at 8.
107. ALI STUDY, note 8 supra, at 63.
108. ALI STUDY, note 8 supra, at 64.
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bar. It would seem that the ALI is taking the position that there can
never be a valid justification for such litigation in federal court. Therefore, the motive behind the choice of a representative need not even
be considered. The proposal is similar in effect to the 1966 congressional
amendment of the basic diversity statute, 10 9 which made the citizenship of an insured controlling for purposes of diversity, even in cases
where the insurance company is the only party sued and the insured
is not joined.
The second ALI proposal to affect "manufactured cases" is section
1307. It provides as follows:
(a) A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party has been made or joined improperly, or collusively, or pursuant to agreement or understanding between opposing
parties, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.
(b) Whenever an object of a sale, assignment, or other transfer of the whole or any part of any interest in a claim or any other
property has been to enable or to prevent the invoking of federal
jurisdiction under this chapter or chapter 158 of this title, jurisdiction of a civil action shall be determined as if such sale, assignment or other transfer had not occurred. The word "transfer" as
used in this section includes the appointment of a trustee, receiver,
or other fiduciary, or of any other person to hold or receive interests
or any kind, whether made by private persons or by a court or
any other official body." 0
A cursory examination of subsection (b) reveals that the ALI is clearly
proposing a motive test for assignments and for those appointments
which do not fall within the mandate of section 1301. The reasoning
employed in proposing section 1307 is much the same as the underlying
basis for section 1301. It is again, a recognition of the true nature of
the transaction involved. The assignment of a claim or interest and
the appointment of a trustee, receiver, or other similar fiduciary may
often occur for reasons other than the creation or defeat of diversity
jurisdiction. The section thus contemplates the existence of valid business reasons for the assignment or appointment."' Where, however, it
appears that the party did not enter the transaction for valid business
reasons, but did so with "an object" of creating or defeating diversity
jurisdiction, then the transaction will not be determinative for purposes
of jurisdiction." 2 But, with the burden of proof on the assignee, a
showing that there has been a "real" assignment - absolute transfer
of property for valuable consideration - would ordinarily negate the
conclusion that "an object" of the assignment was to create diversity
jurisdiction."'
109.
110.
111.
112.

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (Supp. IV 1968).
ALI STUDY, note 8 supra, at 23.
ALI STUDY, note 8 supra, at 102.
Id.

113. Id.
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Section 1307 has several laudible features. Firstly, it seems to disregard the form of an assignment transfer. In doing away with the
objective test of "real" versus "colorability" it examines the motive for
the entire transaction. It is a further recognition that assignments and
appointments in certain cases, may not be actually legally and factually
distinguishable.114 Secondly, in proposing a motive test for trustees, receivers, and similar fiduciaries it builds into the test of jurisdiction the
necessary flexibility that must accompany an area plagued with policy
arguments." 5 But apart from these redeeming features, the motive test,
as proposed, seems to have one serious drawback. It would deny a
party access to federal court where "an object" of the assignment or
appointment was the desire to create or defeat diversity. This does not
take into account the fact that there may be many objects surrounding
the transfer. Its rigidity therefore seems to belittle the ability of courts
to apply a true motive test as it has traditionally been able to do in, for
example, criminal cases. The only difference is that in examining subjective states of mind in such criminal cases, such examination goes to
the merits of the case. Now courts will be asked to examine the same
subjective state of mind shrouded in the nature of procedural and dilatory questions. As previously noted, whole trials may thus occur merely
on these procedurals issues. 116 Delay may then be a natural by-product
of the motive test, but the fact that some cases may take longer to reach
the actual merits will be offset by the fact that more than a few cases
will not even survive the motive test. Therefore, the number of cases
reaching the merits will be reduced and the total amount of time spent
in litigating cases as a whole may actually be lowered.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The two ALI proposals tacitly recognize that there are factual distinctions between the appointment of a fiduciary in certain situations.
In some situations it may be unnecessary to indulge in a motive test because the basic appointment is of the type that should never be
cognizable in federal court; while, on the other hand, those appointments
which could be cognizable in federal court should be subjected to a motive
test. Though the test proposed seems to be valid in principle, it would
probably be too rigid if applied as contemplated. It provides for little,
if any, flexibility and would seriously hinder the judicial process of examining the facts to see if a case is of the type that should be properly
heard in federal court. Additionally, it seems to require severance of
a court's view on the basic grant of diversity jurisdiction from its view
of "manufactured" diversity jurisdiction - an impossible task.
114. See p. 743 & note 103 supra.
115. See p. 728 & notes 6, 8 supra.
116. See p. 741 supra.
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The Third Circuit's decision in McSparran is certainly indicative
of the more realistic approach that must be adopted by courts in assignment and appointment cases. It seems that the Third Circuit would
apply this motive test to the appointment of all types of representatives
presumptively finding that there might be valid justifications for the
appointment of an out-of-state representative in any, and all, types of
appointment cases. The difference between the McSparran and the ALI
proposals is therefore a difference in scope, not philosophy.
The Supreme Court's position in Caribbean Mills is no doubt correct. However the holding must be read narrowly in light of the facts
of the case. In those cases where the facts indicate that there has been
a "real" assignment, courts must not be satisfied with merely chanting
that the assignment was not "colorable" and therefore was sufficient to
create diversity jurisdiction. An examination of "all the circumstances
attending the transfer ' 1 7 - including motive behind it - is the only
approach which faces the reality of the transfer.
Gilbert Newman
117. Ferrara v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Vt.
1967).
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